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ABSTRACT: Proponents of the ontological argument for the existence of God 
typically argue for the existence of a being that has all compossible great-making 
properties. One such property is necessary existence. If necessary existence cannot 
be shown to be a great-making property then various modal ontological arguments 
will fail. Malcom (1960) argues that necessary existence is a great-making property 
as it entails existing a se which makes it a superior property to contingent existence. 
I maintain that Malcom’s argument does not succeed since there is nothing that rules 
out a contingent being, in this case a factually necessary being, from existing a se. 
Utilizing the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), Bernstein (2014) has argued that 
necessary existence is a great-making property. I argue that necessary existence is a 
great-making property whether or not the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true. 
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1 Background 
 
Ontological arguments are a priori arguments that seek to establish the existence 
of a perfect God. According to perfect being theology, God is to be defined as the 
greatest conceivable being, a maximally great being, or a being with all perfections. 
These definitions describe a being that possesses all compossible great-making 
properties. A being is said to have compossible properties when all of that being’s 
properties can coexist together in the same world without a contradiction arising. 
Moreover, this being’s properties must also be consistent with all of the other 
properties that exist in the world, or possible worlds, that this being resides in. Take 
for instance two beings x and y. If being x has the property of being immovable and 
being y has the property of being unstoppable then, presumably, these beings could 
not exist in the same world at the same time without the possibility of a contradiction 
arising.1 Thus, immovability and unstoppability cannot be compossible properties 
and are not found in the same world. Many arguments against the existence of God 
attack the compossibility of God’s traditionally ascribed properties. For example, 
some argue that omniscience and omnipotence are not compossible properties 
(Dawkins 2006, 78). Others argue that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally 
perfect being could not exist simultaneously in a world containing gratuitous evil 
(Sobel 2004, 436-37).  
A perfect being then is a being containing all and only those great-making 
properties that are compossible. Properties such as simplicity, eternality, aseity, 
atemporality, immutability, necessity, and impassibility have traditionally been 
ascribed to the western theistic concept of God. Most theists see omnipotence, 
omniscience, and moral perfection as the most important and essential attributes of 
God. It seems that at least since biblical times, God has been ascribed these 
attributes.2 Yujin Nagasawa, philosopher of religion at the University of 
Birmingham, explains that many ancient philosophers including Plato, Aristotle, and 
Cicero also believed that God should be thought of as a perfect being. Of Aristotle, 
Nagasawa writes “… [Aristotle] thinks that a god is a substance of 'supreme 
excellence', which is akin to the perfect being thesis that God is the being than which 
no greater is metaphysically possible” (Nagasawa 2017, 18). Furthermore, major 
early church fathers also believed in God’s omni-attributes. One such church father 
is Tertullian of Carthage who was the first significant Christian author to write in 
Latin (Lefebure 2015, 31). It seems then that God has been characterized by the omni-
attributes for thousands of years. These properties have become the defining 
characteristics of God in the western tradition.  
 
1 Try to imagine what would happen if these two beings collided.  
2 See Coogan et al (2010), specifically 1 John 3:20 for omniscience, Job 42:1-2 for omnipotence, and 
Psalm 145:17 for moral perfection. 
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2 Anselm’s Argument and Gaunilo’s Reply 
 
Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury in the early 1000’s AD, is one of the most 
important thinkers with regards to God’s attributes and existence. Anselm, in his 
work titled the Proslogion, quotes Psalm 14:1 which says “The fool has said in his 
heart, ‘There is no God.’” In this work, Anselm sought to refute the fool by 
developing an undeniable a priori argument for God’s existence which has come to 
be known as the ontological argument. Anselm argued that upon grasping the very 
idea of God, one could know that God exists. He preferred to understand God as the 
greatest conceivable being. His conceptual ontological argument depends on an 
understanding of two different types of existences: (i) existence in the understanding 
and (ii) existence in reality. Anselm explains what these existences look like as 
follows: (i) describes the existence of a painting in a painter’s mind and (ii) describes 
the finished painting in reality. With this distinction made, Anselm formulates the 
following ontological argument: 
 
1. God, in the understanding, is the greatest conceivable being. 
2. A being that exists in reality is greater than one that exists in 
the understanding alone. 
3. If God, the greatest conceivable being, existed in the 
understanding alone, then He would not be the greatest 
conceivable being. 
4. But it is absurd to say that the greatest conceivable being is not 
the greatest conceivable being. 
5. Therefore, God exists in reality.3 
 
Anselm believed that once we grasp the concept of God as the greatest conceivable 
being, we then have this idea in the understanding. But once we have this idea in the 
understanding it then follows via a reductio ad absurdum that God must exist in 
reality. Of premise 1 Anselm writes: 
 
But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which 
I speak - a being than which nothing greater can be conceived - 
understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his 
understanding; although he does not understand it to exist (Anselm 
1926, 7). 
 
Thus, Anselm believed that the fool should assent to premise 1 and that his 
conclusion logically follows from it. 
 
3 You can find Anselm’s original ontological argument in chapters 2 and 3 of the Proslogion. 
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Gaunilo, a monk who lived during the time of Anselm, believed that Anselm’s 
ontological argument did not work since it could be used to prove a multitude of 
superfluous things. In a letter titled “In Behalf of the Fool”, Gaunilo objects to 
Anselm’s argument with the following parody syllogism:  
 
1. There is an island, in the understanding, which is the greatest 
conceivable island.  
2. Things that exists in reality are greater than things that exist in 
the understanding alone. 
3. If this island existed in the understanding alone, then it would 
not be the greatest conceivable island. 
4. But it is absurd to say that the greatest conceivable island is 
not the greatest conceivable island. 
5. Therefore, the greatest conceivable island exists in reality 
(Anselm 1926, 150-53). 
 
Gaunilo reasons that since Anselm’s argument proves too much, it does not give the 
“fool” a good reason to believe that the greatest conceivable being exists in reality. 
It has been argued that premise 1 of Guanilo’s argument is false. It is difficult to 
think about what properties could make an island the greatest possible island. If we 
say that something like “palm tree quantity” contributes to an island’s greatness, it 
seems then that we could always imagine an island with one more palm tree on it. 
There appears to be no degree of palm trees, or anything material for that matter, that 
would contribute to an island’s greatness. Thus, the greatest conceivable island is an 
incoherent notion since it is always possible to conceive of a greater island. 
 
3 Degreed Properties, Intrinsic Maxima, and Great-Making Properties 
 
More specifically, it is said that “palm tree quantity” lacks an intrinsic maximum 
or upper limit. This is a quality that some degreed properties have. A degreed 
property F is that in which, if it is the case that beings x and y both have property F, 
then it is sensible to say of x that it is more or less F than y (Mann 1975, 151-52). 
Examples of degreed properties include being healthy, being clear, and being afraid. 
Some examples of properties that are degreeless include: “being a human being, 
being an aardvark, being a parent, being on fire, being triangular, being pregnant, 
[and] being less than or equal to 1” (Mann 1975, 151). Take for instance the 
degreeless property “being a human being”. You either are a human being or you are 
not. There are no degrees to humanness. 
Philosopher of religion, William E. Mann, defines an intrinsic maximum in the 
following way: “degreed property F has an intrinsic maximum if and only if there is  
 
 
 
 
DIALOGUE  
 
some possible being, x, such that x is F, and for any other possible being, y, if y is F 
then it is not the case that y is more F than x” (Mann 1975, 152). Not all degreed 
properties have an intrinsic maximum but all properties with an intrinsic maximum 
are degreed. An example of a degreed property that lacks an intrinsic maximum is 
being large since a large object can always be larger (Wainwright 1988, 8). Being 
knowledgeable, powerful, and moral all seem to be degreed properties, but do they 
each have an intrinsic maximum?   
Consider the definition of what it means for some person S to be omniscient: 
“…for every proposition p, if p is true then S knows p” (Wierenga 2018). To be 
omniscient would require one to know all true propositions. Once one acquires 
knowledge of all true propositions, one could not know anything more than this. 
Therefore, being knowledgeable has an intrinsic maximum. Similarly, an omnipotent 
being can do all things that are possibly able to be done. It is not possible for a being 
to be able to do anything more than all things that are possibly doable. Therefore, 
being powerful also has an upper limit or intrinsic maximum. 
The intrinsic maximum of being moral is moral perfection. If God is morally 
perfect, then he will always act in the most morally appropriate way in any given 
circumstance. No one can be more faithful, truthful, or just than someone with moral 
perfection. God’s omnibenevolence, or loving nature, is derived from his moral 
perfection. Etymologically, the term omnibenevolent means “…‘all,’ bene, meaning 
‘well,’ and volentis, meaning to wish or to will. An omnibenevolent being, then, is 
one that wills the well-being of all” (Hudson 1991, 57). If God is morally perfect, 
then he is genuinely concerned with the true flourishing of every created agent. Some 
philosophers believe that God’s morally perfect and loving nature serves as the 
grounds for moral values and obligations.4  
Having an intrinsic maximum is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a 
property to be considered great-making. A property P is great-making if and only if  
 
(1) P has an intrinsic maximum, and  
(2) it is inherently superior to possess P than to lack P.  
 
Condition (2) can be determined by inductive and deductive means but it is mainly 
determined by intuition. For example, it seems intuitively obvious that it is better to 
possess knowledge over ignorance, power over impotence, and moral goodness over 
badness. Overall, it seems that God’s three essential omni-attributes meet conditions 
(1) and (2). Since God’s properties each have an intrinsic maximum and the 
properties that comprise the greatest conceivable island do not, Guanilo’s parody 
argument does not work. Great-making properties, as defined above, allow the 
proponent of the ontological argument to sidestep Gaunilo style parodies.  
 
4 For more on God as the metaphysical grounds of morality, see Adams (2002). 
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4 Immanuel Kant’s Rebuttal 
 
Immanuel Kant, however, had no problem with premise 1 of Anselm’s argument 
but thought that premise 2, things that exists in reality are greater than things that 
exist in the understanding alone, was flawed. It is said that Kant refuted Anselm’s 
ontological argument by arguing that existence is not a predicate. In symbolic 
notation, existence ∃ is merely a quantifier that functions on some object, with a 
certain property or properties, to denote that object’s quantity. For example, ∃xFx 
reads:  
 
There exists at least one thing x such that x has property F.  
 
According to Kant, existence is not inherent in the concept of anything and it does 
not entail any special properties that we could point to as being greater to possess 
than not to possess.  
For Kant, existence does not alter the concept of a being. Conceptually, an 
existent God is not greater than a non-existent God. The two are conceptually equal 
in greatness as they share the exact same properties and are thus identical in 
accordance with Leibniz’s Law. Leibniz’s Law, or the Indiscernability of Identicals, 
states:  
 
∀x∀y[(x=y) → ∀F (F x ↔ F y)]  
or, 
For all things x and y, If x is identical to y, then, for every property F, x has F if and 
only if y has F.  
 
Since, on Kant’s account, existence cannot be a property it therefore follows that 
existent God and non-existent God must be conceptually identical.  
Existence can be thought of as similar to location. For example, Mark can be in 
Glassboro, New Jersey today and in Las Vegas, Nevada tomorrow. Mark’s location 
would change, but Mark himself, and the properties that make Mark who he is, would 
not change. It might be argued that if Mark were to cease to exist then he would 
change. Still, however, the concept of Mark would not change even if he were to 
cease existing. Kant provided an example of one-hundred imaginary dollars and one-
hundred real dollars. Both have the same properties conceptually, and as such, neither 
can conceptually be more valuable than the other. In summary, if there is no concept 
changing difference between existence in the understanding and existence in reality, 
then Anselm’s ontological argument fails. 
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5 Necessary Existence and the Modal Ontological Argument 
 
With this critique, Kant seemed to have defeated Anselm’s ontological argument 
for God’s existence until modal versions of the argument emerged during the 1940’s. 
Proponents of modal ontological arguments usually seek to establish (a) the 
metaphysical possibility of a perfect being and (b) that necessary existence is a great-
making property or perfection. Consider a simple modal ontological argument, 
developed by C’zar Bernstein of Oxford University: 
 
1. Possibly, there exists a being that is perfect.  
2. Necessary existence is a perfection.  
3. There exists a being that is perfect (Bernstein 2014, 666). 
 
This modal version of the ontological argument sidesteps Kant’s criticism by 
implementing the notion of necessary existence. To have the property necessary 
existence is to exist eternally in all possible worlds. Existence simpliciter might not 
be a predicate but necessary existence is a predicate. In order for necessary existence 
to be considered a great-making property it must meet the two conditions laid out 
earlier. Does necessary existence fulfill condition (1) for being a great-making 
property? Since a being cannot exist anywhere else than in all possible worlds, 
presumably then, necessary existence fulfills condition (1). But does necessary 
existence fulfill condition (2) for being a great-making property? It is not 
immediately obvious that eternally existing in all possible worlds makes one greater.  
A being that has the property necessary existence is called a necessary being. A 
being that has the property contingent existence is called a contingent being. For 
modal versions of the ontological argument to work, it must be shown that it is greater 
for a being to exist necessarily than contingently. Why think that a necessary being—
all other properties considered equal—is greater than a being that is contingent? 
Norman Malcolm, American philosopher and Harvard University graduate, argues 
that necessary existence entails existing a se, or metaphysically/aetiologically 
independent, and is therefore greater than contingent existence which lacks this 
entailed property. Consider the following: 
 
If a housewife has a set of extremely fragile dishes, then as dishes 
they are inferior to those of another set like them in all respects 
except that they are not fragile. Those of the first set are dependent 
for their continued existence on gentle handling; those of the 
second set are not. There is a definite connection in common 
language between the notions of dependency and  
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inferiority, and independence and superiority (Malcolm 1960, 47) 
[Malcolm’s italics].  
 
Malcom is correct to point out that independence, or divine aseity, seems superior to 
dependence. Trinitarian philosophers and theologians rely on the notion of aseity 
when arguing for the superiority of the Trinity over Unitarian conceptions of God, as 
seen in Islam, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism among others.5  
So although Malcolm is correct about his judgments on divine aseity, his 
argument for the superiority of a necessary being over a contingent being fails. To 
summarize Malcolm’s point, he wants to say that divine aseity is guaranteed if a 
being exists by necessity and not if a being exists contingently. But if a contingent 
being can exist eternally, how is aseity lost? There is nothing that rules out a 
contingent being existing eternally and if this is so then a contingent being can be 
wholly self-sustaining just like a necessary being.  
One might argue that a necessary being is greater than a contingent being in 
another manner. Since a necessary being exists eternally, it does not have a temporal 
beginning nor is it destructible like a contingent being. It is greater to be uncaused 
and indestructible than causally dependent and destructible. Therefore, it is greater 
to be a necessary being than a contingent being. This argument would work but it 
runs into the same problem as the previous argument. There is nothing ruling out the 
existence of an eternally existing/indestructible contingent being. Still one might try 
to make the argument that being indestructible in all possible worlds, which is what 
you get with a necessary being, is better than only being indestructible in some 
possible worlds (as would be the case for a contingent being). Kenneth Himma in the 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy writes the following with regards to this type of 
argument: 
 
Suppose that an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, eternal 
(and hence, so to speak, indestructible), personal God exists in this 
world but not in some other worlds. It is very hard to make sense 
of the claim that such a God is deficient in some relevant respect. 
God's indestructibility in this world means that God exists eternally 
in all logically possible worlds that resemble this one in certain 
salient respects. It is simply unclear how existence in these other 
worlds that bear no resemblance to this one would make God 
greater and hence more worthy of worship. From our perspective, 
necessary existence adds nothing in value to eternal existence 
(Himma 2015). 
 
5 For an argument for the Trinity, see Davis (2006, p. 65-68). 
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If Himma is correct, which I think he is, then this argument also fails to show the 
superiority of necessary existence over contingent existence. The hopes of preserving 
premise (2) of the modal ontological argument seem dim. 
 
6 The Superiority of Necessary Existence over Contingent Existence 
 
There is one last argument that may prove successful in showing that necessary 
existence is greater than contingent existence. First, let us distinguish between two 
types of necessities. A being is said to exist of metaphysical necessity if that being 
cannot fail to exist in all possible worlds. A contingent being is said to exist of factual 
necessity if it exists eternally and is not causally dependent on anything for its 
existence in any of the possible worlds in which it resides in (Bernstein 2014, 672). 
Contingent beings can only be factually necessary and cannot be metaphysically 
necessary. It is tough to show that a necessary being is greater than a contingent being 
because of factual necessity. 
With this distinction made, let us turn to an argument by C’zar Bernstein for the 
superiority of a necessary being over a contingent being. Consider a modest version 
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR):  
 
Necessarily, for all things x, possibly x has a sufficient explanation of its existence. 
 
If a being is necessary then its sufficient explanation will be found in the necessity of 
its own nature. If a being is contingent then its sufficient explanation will possibly be 
found in an external cause. Abstract objects (like numbers and sets), if they exist, 
could be said to exist by the necessity of their own nature in all possible worlds, 
whereas a cat owes its existence to an external cause (its feline parents). This modest 
PSR necessitates not that there exists a sufficient explanation for every being’s 
existence in the actual world but rather that there is a possible world in which each 
being’s existence is sufficiently explained. 
Recall the definition of a factually necessary being: A contingent being is said to 
exist of factual necessity if it exists eternally and is not causally dependent on 
anything for its existence in any of the possible worlds in which it resides in. But 
given this PSR, all beings, including contingent beings, have a sufficient explanation 
for their existence in some possible world by either another contingent being or a 
necessary being. If this is the case then in the world where a contingent being is 
sufficiently explained, it follows that this being “has the property being dependent on 
another being” (Bernstein 2014, 674). This means that no contingent being can fail 
to be causally dependent on something for its existence which directly contradicts the 
above definition of a factually necessary being. If factual necessity is incoherent, then 
contingent beings are beings which lack perfections. Consider the following 
argument for this conclusion:  
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1. Necessarily, for all things ϕ, if ϕ is an imperfection then being 
possibly ϕ is an imperfection. 
2. Necessarily, being dependent on another being’s existence, 
being caused to exist, and being not eternal are all 
imperfections that all contingent beings possibly have (given 
the above PSR). 
3. Therefore, necessarily, all contingent beings are imperfect 
(Bernstein 2014, 674). 
 
Is premise 1 a plausibly true principle? In defense of this premise, C’zar Bernstein 
writes:  
 
Say that ϕ is any imperfection, and that S lacks ϕ contingently. 
Then S has the property of being possibly ϕ. The reason why this 
is an imperfection is that S is merely accidentally perfect in respect 
to lacking ϕ, which is less great than essentially lacking ϕ; a being 
who essentially lacked ϕ would be perfect in that respect, not 
merely by accident, but of necessity, which is obviously better than 
merely happening to lack ϕ (Bernstein 2014, 674). 
 
It therefore follows that if the PSR and the above principle are sound, then factual 
necessity is not a coherent notion and all contingent beings necessarily have 
imperfections. Therefore, one can reasonably say that necessary existence is a 
perfection. 
As brilliant as Bernstein’s argument is in arguing for the superiority of necessary 
existence, premise 2 of his argument depends upon the controversial Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. Below I supplement premise 2 with a premise that does not rely 
on the PSR, yet, gets us to the same conclusion. 
 
1. Necessarily, for all things ϕ, if ϕ is an imperfection then being 
possibly ϕ is an imperfection. 
2. Necessarily, lacking complete sovereignty is an imperfection 
that all contingent beings possibly have.  
3. Therefore, necessarily, all contingent beings are imperfect. 
 
In order for God to be sovereign over a world, he must exist in that world. It would 
be strange to say that the greatest conceivable being lacks providential control over 
even a single possible world. It is greater for God to be the creator and sustainer of 
all possible worlds as opposed to a finite amount of worlds. Since a factually 
necessary being fails to exist in every possible world, it follows that it lacks complete 
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sovereignty. A being with necessary existence can be completely sovereign over all 
actual and possible state of affairs. If this argument is correct, then necessary 
existence is a perfection with or without the Principle of Sufficient Reason. 
A final concern regarding premise 2 of Bernstein’s modal ontological argument 
concerns Guanilo style parodies again. Can one not just assign necessary existence 
to whatever being or idea of a being that one wants to exist, like Gaunilo’s greatest 
possible island? Viney and Shields, authors of the Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy entry on Charles Hartshorne’s ontological argument, write:  
 
Attaching necessary existence to a being that is properly conceived 
as contingent is the reverse of the error of attaching contingent 
existence to a being that is properly conceived as necessary…. It is 
no accident that it was J. S. Mill, an empiricist, who made famous 
the question, ‘Who made God?’ If ‘God’ signifies a being 
unsurpassable by all others, then asking for the cause of God’s 
existence is on a par with asking what is north of the North Pole. 
Both questions are grammatical, but both are also nonsensical 
(Viney & Shields 2015).  
 
What this means is that necessary existence can only be applied to those beings in 
which it is natural to assign such a property. For example, it would be wholly 
appropriate to consider platonic or mathematical objects, and God as necessarily 
existing things. It would not however be appropriate to consider material things, like 
Guanilo’s island, as necessarily existing. One would be hard pressed to find many 
philosophers or physicists who defend the idea that material things exist of 
metaphysical necessity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, I hope to have given a useful definition of a great-making property. 
I also hope that I have sufficiently motivated premise 2 of the modal ontological 
argument. If my arguments are successful, then it appears that premise 2 of the modal 
ontological argument is more plausibly true than false. Examining premise 1 of the 
modal ontological argument, which concerns the metaphysical possibility of God, is 
beyond the scope of this paper.6 I end with a quote from an ontological argument 
specialist, Robert Maydole “Some ontological arguments are sound, do not beg the 
question, and are insulated from extant parodies. Yet good logic does convince 
sometimes. Other times, something else is needed” (Maydole 2009, 586). 
 
6 For a defense of the first premise of the modal ontological argument, see Bernstein (2018). 
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